Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102722zbMath1501.91098OpenAlexW4281772063MaRDI QIDQ2092768

Elmar G. Wolfstetter, Byoung Heon Jun, Cuihong Fan

Publication date: 3 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102722

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationStackelberg gamesBertrand gamescorporate espionagevalue of information in games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (2)

Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment ⋮ Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion

Cites Work

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• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

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