General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2022.102728zbMath1501.91023OpenAlexW4281629502WikidataQ113870936 ScholiaQ113870936MaRDI QIDQ2092771

Seungjin Han

Publication date: 3 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102728

zbMATH Keywords

competing mechanismsmarket informationstrategy-proof punishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Principal-agent models (91B43) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
• Competing auctions: Finite markets and convergence
• Robust Mechanism Design

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