Imperfect competition in online auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2022.102730zbMath1503.91059OpenAlexW4281682751MaRDI QIDQ2092772

Alexander Maslov, Jesse A. Schwartz

Publication date: 3 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102730

zbMATH Keywords

revenue equivalencecompeting auctionsInternet auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Internet auctions with many traders
• Sequential capacity and price choices in a duopoly model with demand uncertainty
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Competition among auctioneers in large markets
• An empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• Optimal Auction Design
• Price Leadership
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Competing auctions: Finite markets and convergence

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