Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
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Publication:2092786
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102755zbMath1501.91059OpenAlexW4291222661WikidataQ113870934 ScholiaQ113870934MaRDI QIDQ2092786
Publication date: 3 November 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102755
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