Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102755zbMath1501.91059OpenAlexW4291222661WikidataQ113870934 ScholiaQ113870934MaRDI QIDQ2092786

Shuhei Morimoto

Publication date: 3 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102755

zbMATH Keywords

single-peaked preferencesgroup strategy-proofnessprobabilistic rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08)

Cites Work

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• A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
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• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions
• Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs
• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences

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