The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102764zbMath1501.91011OpenAlexW4294877861MaRDI QIDQ2092790

Manfred Besner

Publication date: 3 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102764

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecooperative game(Harsanyi/multiple) dividendsgrand surplusmarginal contributions/surplusrepeated cooperative cross-game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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