Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types
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Publication:2093039
DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01378-1zbMath1504.91009OpenAlexW3186655253MaRDI QIDQ2093039
Publication date: 4 November 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01378-1
Related Items (6)
Two-stage contests with preferences over style ⋮ On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals ⋮ The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation ⋮ Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry ⋮ Prize formation and sharing in multi-stage contests ⋮ Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types
Cites Work
- Who gains from information asymmetry?
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
- Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information
- The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
- Contests with a stochastic number of players
- Information sharing in private value lottery contest
- Contest success functions
- Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
- Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests
- The role of information in contests
- Contests with multiple rounds
- Population uncertainty in contests
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