Defense coordination in security games: equilibrium analysis and mechanism design

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2022.103791OpenAlexW4297323506MaRDI QIDQ2093398

Jiarui Gan, Edith Elkind, Sarit Kraus, Michael Wooldridge

Publication date: 8 November 2022

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2022.103791

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designStackelberg gamesmultiple leaderssecurity gamesdefense coordinationNash-Stackelberg equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

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