The metric distortion of multiwinner voting
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Publication:2093402
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2022.103802OpenAlexW4300961534MaRDI QIDQ2093402
Alexandros A. Voudouris, Ioannis Caragiannis, Nisarg Shah
Publication date: 8 November 2022
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.13332
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