Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information

DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01399-2zbMath1501.91062OpenAlexW4226471951MaRDI QIDQ2093824

Ton Storcken, Shashwat Khare

Publication date: 27 October 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01399-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Partial orders, general (06A06) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Circular domains
• Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Dictatorial domains
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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