Electoral institutions with impressionable voters
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Publication:2093833
DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01406-6zbMath1501.91057OpenAlexW4229071456MaRDI QIDQ2093833
Daniel Diermeier, Costel Andonie
Publication date: 27 October 2022
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01406-6
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- Expressive Voting and Its Cost: Evidence From Runoffs With Two or Three Candidates
- On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
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