The burning coalition bargaining model
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Publication:2093834
DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01409-3zbMath1501.91074OpenAlexW4280599448MaRDI QIDQ2093834
Publication date: 27 October 2022
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01409-3
Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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