Inter-temporal decisions, optimal taxation and non-compliant behaviors in groundwater management

DOI10.1016/J.CNSNS.2022.106872zbMath1501.91125OpenAlexW4296178632WikidataQ114671774 ScholiaQ114671774MaRDI QIDQ2094481

Giovanni Villani, Marta Biancardi, Gianluca Iannucci

Publication date: 28 October 2022

Published in: Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cnsns.2022.106872

zbMATH Keywords

trigger strategygroundwater managementfeedback Stackelberg solutionleader-follower differential gameunauthorized water extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (1)

Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework

Cites Work

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• Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: Economic and management applications
• On differential games with Markov perfect triggering
• Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
• Optimal adaptation strategies to face shocks on groundwater resources
• Groundwater extraction among overlapping generations: a differential game approach
• Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater
• Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case

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