Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105527zbMath1504.91146OpenAlexW4289596130WikidataQ114160467 ScholiaQ114160467MaRDI QIDQ2095253

Jin Yong Jung

Publication date: 9 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105527

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardwealth effectsagent preferencesagency costincentive cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Risk aversion, moral hazard and the principal's loss.
• Wealth effects in the principal agent model
• Wealth effects and agency costs
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
• Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

This page was built for publication: Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems