Price skimming: commitment and delay in bargaining with outside option

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105528zbMath1504.91119OpenAlexW4293763381WikidataQ114160466 ScholiaQ114160466MaRDI QIDQ2095255

Jong Jae Lee, Dongkyu Chang

Publication date: 9 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105528

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingcommitmentoutside optionCoase conjecturepositive selectionprice skimming

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
• Intertemporal Price Discrimination
• Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture: A Strategic Foundation for Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
• An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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