Sequential vote buying

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105529zbMath1504.91232OpenAlexW4290830128WikidataQ114160463 ScholiaQ114160463MaRDI QIDQ2095256

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 9 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105529

zbMATH Keywords

vote buyingpreference heterogeneitycontracting with externalitiesendogenous sequencingtransfer promiseup-front payment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (2)

Collective hold‐up ⋮ Legislative informational lobbying

Cites Work

• Transparency, complementarity and holdout
• On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
• Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
• Breakdown in multilateral negotiations
• Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
• Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
• Majorization and the Lorenz order with applications in applied mathematics and economics
• The timing of contracting with externalities
• Sequential legislative lobbying
• Contracting with Externalities
• Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
• Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
• Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
• Unbundling Polarization

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