Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
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Publication:2095260
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105532OpenAlexW4293385687WikidataQ114160455 ScholiaQ114160455MaRDI QIDQ2095260
Florian Brandl, Dominik Peters
Publication date: 9 November 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105532
strategyproofnessapproval votingdichotomous preferencesCondorcet consistencyconsistency with variable electoratesvariable agendas
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