When does centralization undermine adaptation?

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105533zbMath1504.91078OpenAlexW4292136244WikidataQ114160451 ScholiaQ114160451MaRDI QIDQ2095261

Dimitri Migrow, Shuo Liu

Publication date: 9 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105533

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitiondecentralizationcentralizationverifiable disclosurecoordinated adaptation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

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