Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105541zbMath1504.91053OpenAlexW4294190653WikidataQ114160449 ScholiaQ114160449MaRDI QIDQ2095262

Mehmet Ekmekci, Lucas Maestri

Publication date: 9 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105541

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesimperfect monitoringreputation dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Games of timing (91A55)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Reputation in Continuous-Time Games
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Bargaining with Interdependent Values
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Reputation in Long-Run Relationships
• Value of Persistent Information
• Progressive Learning
• Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation
• Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
• Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values

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