Incomplete contracts versus communication

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105544zbMath1504.91142OpenAlexW4293833768WikidataQ114160446 ScholiaQ114160446MaRDI QIDQ2095265

Inga Deimen, Andreas Blume, Sean Inoue

Publication date: 9 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105544

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractscheap talkstrategic communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

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• Long Cheap Talk
• A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship

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