Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders
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Publication:2095269
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105545zbMath1504.91116OpenAlexW3190045006MaRDI QIDQ2095269
Antonio Rosato, Benjamin Balzer, Jonas von Wangenheim
Publication date: 9 November 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105545
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
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