Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105546zbMath1504.91182OpenAlexW4294549788WikidataQ114160443 ScholiaQ114160443MaRDI QIDQ2095270

Wooyoung Lim, Isa E. Hafalir, Wonki Jo Cho

Publication date: 9 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105546

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencydeferred acceptancetie-breakingchoice-augmented deferred acceptancestable improvement cyclesweak priority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• oTree

Cites Work

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• School choice: an experimental study
• Parallel markets in school choice
• The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
• School Choice with Consent^*
• A theory of school-choice lotteries
• School choice under partial fairness
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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