Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
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Publication:2095276
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105551zbMath1504.91023OpenAlexW4296378831MaRDI QIDQ2095276
Publication date: 9 November 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105551
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