Comparing theories of one-shot play out of treatment
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Publication:2095279
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105554zbMath1504.91005OpenAlexW4296410843MaRDI QIDQ2095279
Philipp Külpmann, Christoph Kuzmics
Publication date: 9 November 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105554
Nash equilibriumrisk aversionquantal response equilibriacognitive hierarchy theorylevel \(k\) theorytesting theories
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Cites Work
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