Hamilton's rule, the evolution of behavior rules and the wizardry of control theory

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2022.111282OpenAlexW4297374210MaRDI QIDQ2095402

Laurent Lehmann

Publication date: 9 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2022.111282

zbMATH Keywords

control theorynatural selectionadaptive dynamicsHamilton's rulesocial evolutionlife-history evolutionbehavior evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Biology and other natural sciences (92-XX)

Cites Work

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