Complexity of shift bribery for iterative voting rules
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Publication:2095550
DOI10.1007/s10472-022-09802-5OpenAlexW4292452171MaRDI QIDQ2095550
Jörg Rothe, Marc Neveling, Ann-Kathrin Selker, Cynthia Maushagen
Publication date: 17 November 2022
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-022-09802-5
Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)
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