Manufacturer's R\&D cooperation contract: linear fee or revenue-sharing payment in a low-carbon supply chain
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2095916
DOI10.1007/S10479-022-04869-ZzbMath1505.90020OpenAlexW4293498621MaRDI QIDQ2095916
Publication date: 15 November 2022
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-022-04869-z
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
Cites Work
- The role of co-opetition in low carbon manufacturing
- A comparison of milestone contract and royalty contract under critical value criterion in R\&D alliance
- Carbon emission reduction and pricing policies of a supply chain considering reciprocal preferences in cap-and-trade system
- Optimal pricing policies for differentiated brands under different supply chain power structures
- Cooperation royalty contract design in research and development alliances: help vs. knowledge-sharing
- Firms' pricing strategies under different decision sequences in dual-format online retailing
- Allocation policy considering firm's time-varying emission reduction in a cap-and-trade system
- Emission allowance allocation mechanism design: a low-carbon operations perspective
- Milestone Payments or Royalties? Contract Design for R&D Licensing
This page was built for publication: Manufacturer's R\&D cooperation contract: linear fee or revenue-sharing payment in a low-carbon supply chain