Characterization of a value for games under restricted cooperation

DOI10.1007/s10479-022-04768-3zbMath1502.91006OpenAlexW4281561596MaRDI QIDQ2095935

M. Josune Albizuri, Satoshi Masuya, José Manuel Zarzuelo

Publication date: 15 November 2022

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-022-04768-3

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueconference structuresR-valuerestricted cooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

1-convex extensions of incomplete cooperative games and the average value

Cites Work

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