Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities
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Publication:2095948
DOI10.1007/s10479-022-04669-5zbMath1505.91037OpenAlexW4220693152MaRDI QIDQ2095948
Publication date: 15 November 2022
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-022-04669-5
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