Spatial games and endogenous coalition formation

DOI10.1007/s10479-021-04493-3zbMath1505.91045OpenAlexW4210716518MaRDI QIDQ2095954

Guillermo Owen, Francesc Carreras

Publication date: 15 November 2022

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-021-04493-3

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsaffinitygamesvalues

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (1)

Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise

Cites Work

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