Reputation and liability in experience goods markets with imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2022.110854zbMath1501.91069OpenAlexW4295345625MaRDI QIDQ2096211

Guoqiang Tian, Yizheng Chen, Jingkui Li

Publication date: 16 November 2022

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110854

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyliabilityreputationimperfect monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Liability and reputation in credence goods markets
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• Who Wants a Good Reputation?

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