Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperation

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2022.127567OpenAlexW4297969145MaRDI QIDQ2096314

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 16 November 2022

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2022.127567

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationpunishmenthuman behaviorpreference reversal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Genetics and population dynamics (92Dxx)

Cites Work

• Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
• Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
• Promoting cooperation by punishing minority
• Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
• Evolution of cooperation in a conformity-driven evolving dynamic social network
• Coevolution of fairness and spite on stochastic dynamics networks
• Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
• Costly participation and the evolution of cooperation in the repeated public goods game
• Preference reversals: the impact of truth-revealing monetary incentives
• Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
• Evolution of cooperation driven by collective interdependence on multilayer networks

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