Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret
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Publication:2097664
DOI10.1007/s10107-021-01615-4zbMath1504.91108OpenAlexW3122059861MaRDI QIDQ2097664
Çağıl Koçyiğit, Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Daniel Kuhn
Publication date: 14 November 2022
Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01615-4
Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Robustness in mathematical programming (90C17)
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