Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret

DOI10.1007/s10107-021-01615-4zbMath1504.91108OpenAlexW3122059861MaRDI QIDQ2097664

Çağıl Koçyiğit, Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Daniel Kuhn

Publication date: 14 November 2022

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01615-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Robustness in mathematical programming (90C17)

Related Items (1)

Special issue: Global solution of integer, stochastic and nonconvex optimization problems

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Robust screening under ambiguity
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
• Robust monopoly pricing
• Haggling over substitutes
• Optimization and mechanism design
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• Robust strategic bidding in auction-based markets
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Euler’s constant: Euler’s work and modern developments
• Theory and Applications of Robust Optimization
• Optimal Auction Design
• Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
• Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach
• Pessimistic Bilevel Optimization
• The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design
• The Theory of Statistical Decision

This page was built for publication: Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret