Limited-tenure concessions for collective goods

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104484OpenAlexW3197925610MaRDI QIDQ2097989

Christopher Costello, Nicolas Quérou, Agnes Tomini

Publication date: 17 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104484

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamespublic goodscooperationnatural resourcesconcessionsspatial externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Related Items (1)

Policy effectiveness in spatial resource wars: a two-region model

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