Losing funds or losing face? Reputation and accountability in the credit rating industry

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104520OpenAlexW4293722545MaRDI QIDQ2098016

Wiebke Szymczak, Martin Angerer, Matthias Herrmann-Romero

Publication date: 17 November 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104520

zbMATH Keywords

experimentconflict of interestreputationaccountabilityrating agencies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Uses Software

• oTree

Cites Work

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• Incentives and cheating
• Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability
• Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
• Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies
• Does Competition Affect Truth Telling? An Experiment with Rating Agencies*
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling

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