Managerial reputation, risk-taking, and imperfect capital markets

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2014-0104OpenAlexW2410237275MaRDI QIDQ2098868

Koji Asano

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2014-0104

zbMATH Keywords

reputationrisk-takinginvestment decisionpledgeabilityinvestor protection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Portfolio theory (91G10)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
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• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
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• Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking
• Corporate Governance
• Multinational Firms, FDI Flows, and Imperfect Capital Markets^*
• Competing engines of growth: innovation and standardization

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