A nonspeculation theorem with an application to committee design

DOI10.1515/bejte-2015-0103OpenAlexW2604451509MaRDI QIDQ2098887

W. Ramsay Kristopher, Jidong Chen, Mark Fey

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0103

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Expert advice to a voting body
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Agreeing to disagree
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Learning game theory from John Harsanyi

This page was built for publication: A nonspeculation theorem with an application to committee design