Strong forward induction

DOI10.1515/bejte-2016-0067OpenAlexW3125470734MaRDI QIDQ2098894

Bingyong Zheng

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0067

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium refinementbeliefforward induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of game theory (91A80) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Forward induction equilibrium
• Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility
• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• On Forward Induction
• Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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