Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies

DOI10.1515/bejte-2016-0131OpenAlexW2604187725MaRDI QIDQ2098899

Benjamín Tello

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0131

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingNash equilibriaacyclicitydropping strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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