Sharing the effort costs in group contests

DOI10.1515/bejte-2016-0108OpenAlexW3122396729MaRDI QIDQ2098912

Alexis Vázquez-Sedano

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0108

zbMATH Keywords

group contestendogenous cost sharing rulespublic prizeunderperforming

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information
• Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests
• A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups
• In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation
• Contest success functions
• Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes

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