Symmetric equilibria in a cost-averting war of attrition requiring minimum necessary conceders

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2016-0109OpenAlexW2758182274MaRDI QIDQ2098913

Bara Kim, Geofferey Jiyun Kim

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0109

zbMATH Keywords

Bellman equationNash equilibriumwar of attritionpublic economicstrembling hand perfection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Joint Projects without Commitment

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