Hybrid invariance and oligarchic structures

DOI10.1515/bejte-2016-0145OpenAlexW2770593289MaRDI QIDQ2098920

Susumu Cato

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0145

zbMATH Keywords

filteroligarchyhybrid invariance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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