Connected price dynamics with revealed preferences and Auctioneer's discretion in VCG combinatorial auction

DOI10.1515/bejte-2016-0168OpenAlexW2141284574MaRDI QIDQ2098923

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0168

zbMATH Keywords

connectednesscombinatorial auctionsVCG mechanismsprice-demand proceduresprovisional valuation functionsrevealed preference activity rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• The package assignment model.
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
• Incentives in Teams

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