Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2016-0196OpenAlexW3125802582MaRDI QIDQ2098925

Ella Segev, Gal Cohensius

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0196

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric auctionsfirst price auctionsecond price auctionsequential bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
• Simultaneous vs. sequential price competition with incomplete information
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• Asymmetric first price auctions
• Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions

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