Limited liability and high bids in English auctions

DOI10.1515/bejte-2016-0152OpenAlexW2792599612MaRDI QIDQ2098944

Tao Wang, Ruqu Wang

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0152

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsexternalityrevenue comparison

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement
• On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• High bids and broke winners

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