Structural control in weighted voting games
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Publication:2098945
DOI10.1515/bejte-2016-0169OpenAlexW2883677140WikidataQ129496224 ScholiaQ129496224MaRDI QIDQ2098945
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0169
Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)
Related Items (3)
Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota ⋮ Manipulation in communication structures of graph-restricted weighted voting games ⋮ Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
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