Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions

DOI10.1515/bejte-2016-0185OpenAlexW2804460388WikidataQ114053189 ScholiaQ114053189MaRDI QIDQ2098951

Steffen Lippert, Addison Pan, Simona Fabrizi

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0185

zbMATH Keywords

simulationsvoting rulesgroup decision-makingjury trialreferendahuman-subjects laboratory experimentnon-congruent views

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Related Items (1)

A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A minimal extension of Bayesian decision theory
• Deliberative voting
• Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior
• When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
• Small worlds: Modeling attitudes toward sources of uncertainty
• An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
• An Incentive‐Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem*

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