Wars of attrition with endogenously determined budget constraints
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Publication:2098953
DOI10.1515/bejte-2016-0197OpenAlexW3123878464MaRDI QIDQ2098953
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0197
Cites Work
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- ``Bucket auctions for charity
- Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
- The Devolution of Declining Industries
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- Optimal Auction Design
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