Vertical contract and competition intensity in Hotelling's model

DOI10.1515/bejte-2017-0048zbMath1506.91120OpenAlexW2752517943MaRDI QIDQ2098959

Xingtang Wang, Leonard F. S. Wang, Jie Li

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0048

zbMATH Keywords

spatial competitionmaximum (minimum) differentiationvertical structureintensity of rivalry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (2)

Downstream competition and profits under different input price bargaining structures ⋮ Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare

Cites Work

• Hotelling's competition with relative performance evaluation
• Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms
• Tax effects in a model of product differentiation: A note
• Competition and privatization policies revisited: the payoff interdependence approach
• Welfare properties of strategic R\&D investments in Hotelling models
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"

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