Sellouts, beliefs, and bandwagon behavior

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2016-0187OpenAlexW3124798732MaRDI QIDQ2098964

Nick Vikander

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0187

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalityconformitysellouts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (2)

Information design through scarcity and social learning ⋮ Monopolistic Signal Provision

Cites Work

• Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device
• Loss aversion and the uniform pricing puzzle for media and entertainment products
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• Conspicuous Consumption and Sophisticated Thinking
• Strategic Capacity Rationing to Induce Early Purchases
• Inferior Products and Profitable Deception
• Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
• Competitive Non-linear Pricing and Bundling
• Add-on Pricing in Retail Financial Markets and the Fallacies of Consumer Education*
• Cursed Equilibrium

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