Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability

DOI10.1515/bejte-2017-0072OpenAlexW2183656449MaRDI QIDQ2098976

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0072

zbMATH Keywords

marginal stabilityBayesian incentive compatibilityinterim individual rationalityefficient combinatorial allocationsopt-out types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
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• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Incentives in Teams
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
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